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ABSTRACT
Innovation  policy  often  involves  an  uncomfortable  trade-off  between  rewarding  innovators
sufficiently and providing the innovation at the lowest possible price. However, in health care
markets with insurance for innovative goods, society may be able to ensure efficient rewards for
inventors and the efficient dissemination of inventions. Health insurance resembles a two-part
pricing contract in which a group of consumers pay an up-front fee ex ante in exchange for a fixed
unit price ex post. This functions as if innovators themselves wrote efficient two-part pricing
contracts, where they extracted sufficient profits from the ex ante payment, but still sold the good
ex post at marginal cost. As a result, we show that complete, efficient, and competitive health
insurance for innovative products - such as new drugs, medical devices, or patented procedures - can
lead to perfectly efficient innovation and utilization, even when moral hazard exists. Conversely,
incomplete insurance markets in this context lead to inefficiently low levels of innovation. Moreover,
optimally designed public health insurance for innovative products can solve the innovation problem
by charging ex ante premia equal to consumer surplus, and ex post co-payments at or below marginal
cost. When these quantities are unknown, society can usually improve static and dynamic welfare
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A.  Introduction 
The  difficulty  of  encouraging  innovation  is  well-appreciated  (Nordhaus,  1969;  Wright, 
1983).  Innovators need to reap profits in the event of a successful innovation, but profits for 
a producer often are at odds with social efficiency.  Society must make a difficult choice 
between rewarding today’s patients with lower prices, or rewarding tomorrow’s patients by 
inducing more innovation.  In many respects, this is viewed as a zero-sum game that requires 
trading off the welfare of one group for the welfare of the other.   
However, in the particular context of health care innovation, society may be able to achieve 
efficiency  for  both  today’s  and  tomorrow’  patients.    The  unique  and  important  role  of 
insurance in these markets explains why.  Health insurance resembles a two-part pricing 
contract, in which a group of consumers pays an upfront fee in exchange for lower prices in 
the  event  of  illness.    Such  two-part  pricing  contracts  can  guarantee  both  the  efficient 
utilization  of  a  product  for  today’s  patients,  and  a  sufficient  level  of  profit  to  induce 
innovation on behalf of tomorrow’s patients (see the seminal paper by Oi, 1971).  While this 
is well-understood, two-part pricing is rarely feasible on a large-scale.  In the context of 
medical care innovations, however, the existence of health insurance as a two-part pricing 
strategy changes the terms of the debate between today’s patients and tomorrow’s patients.  
Clearly,  encouraging  innovation  is  somewhat  less  important  in  the  delivery  of  well-
established,  routine  care,  but  is  quite  important  for  a  wide  range  of  medical  goods  and 
services, such as prescription drugs, devices, and patentable procedures.
1 
                                                   
1 Total sales of medical devices were about half drug sales in the US.  (This result is based on 
calculations from 1997 SIC output statistics; since 1997, updated industrial classification makes it 
harder to isolate medical devices.)  Patented procedures are growing increasingly less important.  
Since 1952, the US has granted patents to medical procedures, but all patents granted after 1996 
cannot  be  enforced  against  a  physician  who  infringes  them  while  performing  surgery  or 3 
The efficient solution to the innovation problem requires both that the innovation be sold at 
marginal cost ex post, and that the innovator receive ex post profits equal to the net consumer 
surplus associated with the innovation.  When it is feasible, two-part pricing by innovators 
can accomplish both those goals simultaneously.  An innovator can charge an upfront fee 
equal to net consumer surplus, a fee that then allows consumers to buy  as much of the 
innovation as they like at marginal cost.  The analogy to health insurance is fairly direct.  A 
health insurance plan with a co-payment equal to marginal cost, and an ex ante premium 
equal  to  net  consumer  surplus  would  achieve  efficiency.    This  allows  health  insurers  to 
extract the full value of consumer surplus.  When the insurance industry  is competitive, 
innovators will end up with the entire surplus; they will be able to extract it either by writing 
their  own  two-part  pricing  contract  with  insurers,  or  simply  by  negotiating  a  price  and 
quantity with competitive insurers, who will earn zero profits for themselves in equilibrium. 
The mechanics of the insurance contract are similar to a two-part pricing contract, and the 
uncertain demand for a health-care innovation plays a fundamental role.  It is often difficult 
to find and contract with groups of potential consumers ex ante, but group health insurance 
provides  a  natural  and  practical  way  to  do  so.    Moreover,  when  consumers  differ,  it  is 
necessary but very difficult to extract ex ante payments that accurately reflect the varying 
levels of surplus each consumer derives.  However, uncertain demand facilitates this process, 
because  a  great  deal  of  heterogeneity  emerges  ex  post,  after  the  contract  is  written.  
Consumers may thus be induced to pay their expected surplus ex ante, at which point there is 
more similarity among them. 
                                                                                                                                                       
delivering medical care.  Therefore, the only effective patents in the US are those issued between 
1952 and 1996 (World Medical Association, 1999). 4 
Relying on the idea of health insurance as a two-part pricing contract, we show that complete 
and competitive health insurance markets ensure efficiency in both utilization and innovation, 
because they deliver the efficient two-part pricing strategy.  Therefore, completing insurance 
markets can help improve the efficiency of both discovery and utilization.  Even when moral 
hazard exists, competitive insurance markets yield the second-best allocation of resources 
that represents the best outcome achievable by society.  
This suggests that distortions in the insurance market — e.g., monopoly power, distortionary 
subsidies  or  taxes,  or  asymmetric  information  —  have  dynamic  costs  in  the  form  of 
inefficient innovation.  Promoting efficiency in insurance markets for innovative goods can 
thus improve static and dynamic efficiency.  In and of themselves, insurance markets never 
lead to the over-provision of innovation, even when moral hazard exists.  Moreover, patent 
monopolies  introduce  static  inefficiency  to  the  extent  that  health  insurance  markets  are 
distorted. 
In some cases, the government may be unable to ensure efficiency in the private market for 
insurance.  If so, there is a unique justification for public health insurance, as a means of 
ensuring  ex  ante  and  ex  post  efficiency  in  the  market  for  health  care.    Our  model  also 
provides guidance for the optimal design of a public health insurance scheme for drugs or 
other innovative products:  co-payments ought to be set to marginal cost, while premia ought 
to equal consumer surplus.  When regulators cannot observe one or both of these quantities, a 
practical and often welfare-improving strategy is to mimic observed private health insurance 
contracts for the same goods and services. 
We develop our argument by analyzing three progressively less ideal contexts, and showing 
how health insurance markets can lead to first-best or second-best efficiency in all these 
different settings.  As a benchmark, we begin with first-best efficiency, where all consumers 5 
are identical ex ante, and all ex post heterogeneity is fully observable to the innovator and to 
insurance  companies.    In  this  classical  setting,  the  first-best  is  achievable  with  price-
discrimination,  or  equivalently  with  an  efficient  health  insurance  market  that  yields  the 
optimal  two-part  pricing  contract.    We  then  move  to  the  case  of  moral  hazard:    while 
innovators and insurers know the distribution of demands ex ante, they cannot observe ex 
post which consumers are the heaviest demanders.  Incomplete information bars us from the 
first-best outcome, but competitive health insurance contracts markets still match the second-
best efficient outcome.  Finally, we consider the case in which a new innovator must compete 
with an incumbent.  This can lead to rent-seeking behavior, where a new entrant invests 
excessively in innovation simply to secure some of the incumbent’s profits.  Here, we show 
that  unregulated  and  competitive  health  insurance  markets  remain  optimal,  and  that  any 
necessary policy intervention ought to take the form of a lump-sum tax on the ex post profits 
of the new innovator. 
B.  First-Best Insurance and Innovation 
It  is  well-known  that  ex  post  and  ex  ante  efficiency  are  often  at  odds  in  the  case  of 
innovation.  On the one hand, the inventor ought to receive the full social surplus associated 
with his invention.  Internalizing the full value leads to efficient investments in innovation ex 
ante.  However, efficient utilization of the product requires that it be sold at marginal cost.  
This leaves little room for profit. 
There are a few important cases where ex post and ex ante efficiency can be reconciled.  The 
traditional  case  is  that  of  perfect  price-discrimination.    When  heterogeneity  is  fully 
observable by all parties in the economy, the first-best allocation is achievable simply by 
granting a patent monopoly and ensuring the existence of a competitive insurance market.  
The  monopolist  engages  in  perfect  price  discrimination  ex  post,  and  consumers  insure 6 
themselves fully so that consumption is equal across all types.  While this case is rarely 
observed, it serves as a benchmark of perfect efficiency.  As a result, we begin by analyzing 
the  joint  determination  of  innovation  and  insurance  when  information  about  demand  is 
perfect.  We also show that an efficient health insurance market can equivalently attain the 
first-best,  even  without  price-discrimination,  by  offering  the  efficient  two-part  pricing 
contract. 
B.1  The Pareto Optimum 
Suppose society is deciding how much to spend researching a new innovation.  Spending r  
resources yields the probability of discovery  ) (r r .  Consumers vary in their health and in 
their demand for the new innovation.  To represent this, suppose they are indexed by i and 
distributed uniformly over [0,1].  Ex ante, individuals do not know what value of i will be 
realized for them; ex post, i measures the extent of the individual’s illness.  Expected utility 
is the uniform average of utility across  ] 1 , 0 [ Î i . 
The fraction of consumers s  falls ill:  if  s £ i , the consumer is sick, and vice-versa.  Sick 
consumers experience a loss of consumption  L.  The health-care innovation can partially 
restore health, but its effectiveness varies.  Define its utility value to consumer i as  ) (i v , 
where  v  falls with i.  If  W is the wealth of the consumer then utility in each state i is 
defined as follows: 
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u W L if sickbutdoesnotuseinnovation
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  (1) 7 
Assume that:  (1) Every consumer is endowed with wealth W , (2) The innovation can be 
produced ex post at marginal cost  MC , and (3) The social marginal utility of resources is  m .  
The efficient allocation of resources maximizes expected social surplus according to:
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The solution to this problem is the familiar one of:  (1) Full insurance for the innovation, (2) 
Utilization of the innovation until marginal cost equals marginal willingness to pay, and (3) 
The marginal cost of research equals the expected increment to social surplus associated with 
the innovation.  The first order conditions are: 
 
( ) ( ) ) ( ' )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( '
* ) ( ) (




L r W u r L r W u di i v di i c u r
MC q v r
i i c u r
q
s r l s r
l r
l r
- - - + = ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿








  (3) 
We can simplify these expressions as follows: 
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2 In the absence of discovery, there is full indemnity insurance for health. 8 
These  three  equations  embody  the  three  conditions  above  —  efficient  utilization,  full 
insurance, and a research decision that internalizes the full increment to social surplus. 
B.2  The Competitive Equilibrium 
Consider the case where a patent monopoly is granted to the innovator in the second period.  
Assume further that there exists a perfectly competitive insurance market.  The monopolist 
sets quantity and prices, while consumers decide how much insurance to purchase.  To close 
the economy, suppose also that consumers own equal shares in the innovating firm, which 
earns ex post profits p . 
Without an innovation, the consumer chooses full indemnity insurance.  In the event of an 
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Insurers and the innovator must respect consumers’ optimal decisions regarding insurance 
and utilization.  Therefore, the monopolist maximizes expected profits, but subject to:  (1) 9 
Optimal insurance demand, and (2) Optimal utilization, which requires that consumers using 
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The competitive equilibrium defined by these conditions is equivalent to the Pareto-Optimum 
in equation 4.  First, observe that the ability of  the monopolist to extract full consumer 














which matches the condition for first-best efficiency. 
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This is identical to Pareto optimal consumption. 
Finally, taking a first-order approximation to the condition for first-best research yields:
3 
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3 Full insurance implies that the marginal utility of consumption is equal across illness states, in 
the event of an innovation.  Moreover, in a world with many simultaneous innovations, the event 
of  discovery  will  not  affect  marginal  utility,  because  simultaneous  research  functions  as 
insurance.  Therefore, we assume that marginal utility is equal across the discovery and no-







i p » ,  this  condition  is  met  in  competitive  equilibrium,  according  to  the 
consumer’s first order conditions in 9. 
B.3  The Competitive Equilibrium Without Price Discrimination 
Notice  that  the  competitive  equilibrium  with  a  monopolist  patent  holder  and  indemnity 
insurance only produced the first-best outcome when the monopolist was allowed to price 
discriminate. The ability to set prices based on the health (willingness to pay) of consumers 
was the key to achieving dynamic efficiency. However, it is likely that legal, political and 
social  restrictions  impede  the  monopolist’s  ability  to  price  discriminate,  especially  when 
sicker consumers have higher willingness to pay. This naturally raises the question: Can the 
first-best be achieved when legal, social or political restrictions prohibit price discrimination? 
In this section we show that the first-best can be achieved even with restrictions on price 
discrimination.  Health  insurance  enables  the  monopolist  to  solve  the  dynamic  efficiency 
problem even in the absence of classic price-discrimination.  If structured efficiently, an 
insurance contract can function as a two-part pricing scheme, where an insurer allows its 
insureds to pay marginal cost for drugs in the form of a co-payment, but then transfers an 
upfront payment to the drug manufacturer that is equal to the drug’s total social value.  This 
scheme leads to the first-best level of innovation and the first-best level of drug utilization
4.  
The key to the success of this scheme is that consumers do not know their willingness to pay 
ex-ante. This makes drug purchase a risky decision and thus creates a demand for insurance. 
The insurance market in turn enables the monopolist to extract consumer surplus.  
                                                   
4  This  result  only  holds  when  the  consumption  of  the  innovation  has  no  external  effects. 
Intervention  in  this  market  might  be  warranted  when  the  innovation  has  consumption 
externalities. Philipson and Mechoulan (2005) discuss appropriate market interventions in the 
presence of technological change and consumption externalities.  11 
Consider a health insurance contract where consumers are charged a premium  I and pay 
copay  m for the purchase of the innovation. Consumers also receive insurance pay-outs 
( ) K i depending  upon  their  health  i .  We  assume  that  the  health  insurance  market  is 
competitive and insurers make zero profits. The monopolist charges a fixed fee  F  to supply 
the innovation to insurers and an ex-post price  p. We show that this market produces the 
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Under  this  contract  insurers  make  zero  profits  as  they  pass  their  entire  surplus  to  the 
monopolist as a fixed fee and ex-post price for purchasing the innovation.  Moreover, the co-
payment  equals  marginal  cost  under  the  insurance  contract.  Therefore,  consumers  with 
* i q < consume the product. This is the condition for first-best utilization, where consumers 
with  willingness  to  pay  below  marginal  costs  are  excluded  from  the  market  for  the 
innovation.  
The profits of the monopolist under this contract are: 
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Equation (13) shows that under this insurance contract and fixed fee the monopolist is able to 
extract the entire social surplus due to the innovation. Clearly, this contract maximizes profits 12 
from  the  production  of  the  innovation,  as  the  social  surplus  from  the  innovation  is  the 
maximum profit that can be extracted from the innovation.  
The risk-neutral monopolist chooses r to maximizes profits from R&D: 
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Substituting for 
* p in equation (15) reveals that the first order condition for the monopolist is 
exactly identical to the first order condition for maximizing dynamic efficiency.  Note that 
innovators could just as easily replicate this outcome by writing a price-quantity contract 
) , (





di i p pq .    When  health  insurance  functions  as  a  two-part 
pricing contract, the innovator herself does not need to write a two-part contract:  all the 
surplus extracted by the insurer will end up with the innovator, when the insurance industry is 
competitive. 
Finally, consumption in each health state given this insurance contract is:  
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Substituting  the  insurance  contract  from  equation  (12)  and  the  monopolist  profits  from 
equation (13) in the above equation yields that consumption in each health state i is: 
   ( ) i q MC L r W i c " - - - = , *
* s   (17) 13 
Thus,  this  insurance  contract  and  fixed  fee  also  yields  full  insurance  for  consumers, 
consequently maximizing consumer surplus. Therefore the insurance contract and fixed fee 
schedule characterized in equation (12) yields the first best outcome as: 
·  Utilization of the innovation is optimal 
·  Investment in R&D is optimal 
·  The  monopolist  maximizes  profits,  consumers  maximize  expected  utility,  and  a 
competitive insurance industry earns zero profits  
C.  Second-Best With Hidden Information 
Often, and particularly in the case of health, it is very difficult to verify the extent of illness 
or the true demand for a health care innovation (Arrow, 1963).  However, it is extremely easy 
to verify whether a consumer chooses to use an innovation.  Not surprisingly, one often 
observes health insurance contracts that reimburse consumers when they use an innovation, 
but it is very rare to find a “true indemnity” contract where consumers are reimbursed based 
on their underlying health state.  As a result, we now consider the case where use, but not 
underlying  disease,  is  observable.    This  leads  to  contracts  that  can  be  contingent  on  a 
consumer’s  decision  to  purchase  the  innovation,  but  not  on  the  true  state  i.    The 
incompleteness  of  information  means  that  we  will  no  longer  attain  the  first-best  Pareto 
Optimum,  but  we  can  analyze  the  second-best  efficient  allocation  and  its  associated 
competitive equilibrium. 
C.1  The Pareto Optimum 
Define  D c   as  the  consumption  of  a  demander  (gross  of  health  losses  L),  and  N c   as 
consumption for a non-demander (also gross of health losses).  Insurance contracts can be 
written on the basis of observed demand, but not on the basis of type i.  The second-best 14 
efficient  allocation  of  resources  maximizes  expected  utility  for  consumers,  subject  to 
resource  constraints,  and  the  incentive  compatibility  of  the  chosen  allocation.    The 
incompleteness of information means that contracts must be self-enforcing.  The marginal 
sick demander must be exactly as well off as the marginal non-sick demander; otherwise, 
there  are  incentives  for  marginal  consumers  to  “cheat”  by  picking  the  other  group’s 
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In  addition  to  the  two  constraints  (at  equality),  the  second-best  efficient  allocation  is 
characterized  by  four  first-order  conditions,  where  l r ) (r   and  m r ) (r   are  the  (scaled) 
Lagrange multipliers associated with the resource and incentive compatibility constraints, 
respectively: 
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(19) 
While it is not possible to solve for an explicit equilibrium without imposing functional form 
restrictions, several qualitative results can be proven from the equilibrium conditions.  The 
                                                   
5 Notice that the absence of indemnity insurance lowers utility in the no-discovery state relative to 
the  first-best.    Technically,  this  raises  society’s  incentive  to  innovate,  compared  to  the  full 
information case, because innovation functions as an insurance technology.  This incentive is not 
very meaningful in practice, since indemnity health insurance contracts exist largely in theory. 15 
second-best equilibrium involves:  (1) Partial but incomplete insurance, (2) More than first-
best utilization of the innovation, but (3) Less than first-best investment in research.
6   
Incomplete  Insurance.  The  incentive-compatibility  constraint  proves  there  cannot  be 
complete insurance, since the constraint requires that  N D c c < .  However, there is some 
insurance provided to the demanders of the innovation. 
First note that the expected marginal utility of wealth must by necessity be less than the 
marginal utility of consumption in the poorest state, or  ) ( ' L c u D - < l .
7  As a result, the 
multiplier m  must be negative, according to the first order condition for  D c .  Some algebraic 
manipulation of the six equilibrium conditions allows us to express the resource constraint 
multiplier in terms of equilibrium quantities: 
  ) ( ' ) ( q v c c MC N D m l = - +   (20) 
This  condition  implies  that  the  marginal  social  value  of  the  innovation  is  equal  to  the 
effective price paid by the marginal consumer.  Since  0 > l  and  0 < m , it must be true 
that  N D c MC c > + , so that demanders do not bear the full cost of the innovation. 
                                                   
6  Technically,  the  result  that  first-best  research  exceeds  second-best  research  may  fail,  since 
indemnity insurance is possible in the no-discovery state when there is full information, but not 
when there is incomplete information.  Given the rarity of indemnity insurance, however, we 
abstract from this effect. 
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N .    Therefore,  the  numerator  is  strictly  less  than  unity,  while  the 
denominator is strictly greater than unity.  The result then follows. 16 
Excessive Utilization.  The latter result also implies that utilization exceeds the first-best 
level.  Incentive compatibility requires that private marginal cost equals private marginal 
benefit, in the sense that  ) ( ) ( ) ( L c u L c u q v D N - - - = .  Insurance implies that private 
marginal cost is less than social marginal cost.  As a result, we end up with over-utilization.  
This is the classic moral hazard that results when underlying demand is unobservable. 
Less than First-Best Innovation.  Due to hidden information, second-best maximum social 
surplus will be strictly less than the first best, and so will the returns to innovation.  The result 
is less innovation, even though (and indeed because) moral hazard induces inefficient over-
utilization compared to the first-best.
8 
C.2  The Competitive Equilibrium 
Since  information  is  hidden,  the  monopolist  cannot  practice  perfect  price-discrimination.  
However, since consumers are ex ante identical, it can engage in two-part pricing, which can 
also lead to the extraction of consumer surplus.  Suppose there is a perfectly competitive 
insurance industry.  The innovator charges each insurer an upfront license fee F  in return for 
the right to purchase its invention, but then sells each unit of output for a constant price  p .  
Insurers sell insurance policies to consumers for the ex ante insurance premium I , which 
entitles  the  consumer to purchase  the  innovation from  the insurer at  the  co-payment  m .  
Markets arranged in this way will produce the second-best efficient outcome with hidden 
information. 
Note that this arrangement is equivalent to one in which the innovator charges an ex ante 
license fee and an ex post unit price to consumers, who can then purchase insurance contracts 
                                                   
8 As discussed in footnotes 5 and 6, this abstracts from the fact that utility in the no-discovery 
state is higher under full information, because of the possibility of indemnity insurance for health. 17 
that pay out contingent on purchase of the drug.  We choose to model the insurer as an 
intermediary  because  it  is  closer  to  the  way  health  care  markets  actually  function,  and 
because insurance markets can play a real role in limiting the costs of contracting with groups 
of consumers. 
C.2.1  Second-Best Efficiency of Utilization 
In  competitive  equilibrium,  the  consumer  chooses  the  states  of  the  world  in  which  to 
purchase  the  innovation, taking  as  given  the  insurance  contract  offered  by  the insurance 
industry.
9 
￿ + - + - + - - + - + - - - +
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(21) 
The consumer’s optimal utilization decision sets the marginal benefit of the innovation equal 
to the private marginal cost: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( I m L W u I L W u q v - - - + - - - + = p p   (22) 
This is equivalent to the second-best utilization condition:   ) (q v  is equal to the difference in 
utility across the consuming and non-consuming states of illness. 
C.2.2  Second-Best Efficiency of State-Specific Consumption 
Taking as given the offer of the innovator, the representative insurer maximizes profits by 
choosing its contract parameters and its purchases of the good from the innovator, subject to 
consumers’  participation  in  the  insurance  market,  ex  post  incentive  compatibility,
10  and 
demand function  ) (m d . 
                                                   
9 Without loss of generality, if the consumer decides to purchase the innovation in state j, he will 
also decide to do so for all states  j i £ . 
10 Consumers purchasing the invention must be better off purchasing than not purchasing, from 
their ex post point of view. 18 
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Maximizing  profits  subject  to  a  reservation  utility  condition  is  equivalent to  maximizing 
utility subject to a nonnegativity constraint on profits (i.e., a “reservation profits level”).
11  
Moreover, choosing a co-payment subject to a demand function is equivalent to choosing a 
level of quantity subject to remaining on the demand function.  Finally, defining willingness 
to pay as  ) (q T  (a scalar multiple of  ) (q v ), staying on the demand function requires that 
) (q T m =   in  equilibrium.    With  these  three  observations  in  mind,  we  can  rewrite  the 
problem as one whose notation conforms more closely to the second-best Pareto problem. 
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In addition to the two constraints at equality, the first order conditions for this problem are: 
                                                   
11 This problem is associated with an equilibrium condition that sets the consumer’s expected 
utility  equal  to  her  reservation  utility  level.    Note  that  the  profit-maximizing  version  of  the 
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The  competitive  condition  for  I   in  25  matches  the  sum  of  the  second-best  efficiency 
conditions for  N c  and  D c . 
As long as the innovator prices at marginal cost, the competitive condition for  q  in 25 
matches the second-best efficiency condition in equation 20.  While this latter result is not 
immediate, it follows once we observe that the sum of the second-best efficiency conditions 
for q  and  D c  imply the term in square brackets is zero. 
It  remains  to  show  only  that  the  innovator  will  choose  to  price  at  marginal  cost,  in 
competitive  equilibrium.    Intuitively,  marginal  cost  pricing  by  the  innovator  allows  the 
insurer to pass the same along to consumers; since this strategy maximizes the consumer 
surplus available for extraction, it represents the profit-maximizing strategy for the innovator. 
Formally, the innovator’s ex post decision involves maximizing her profits subject to the 
participation of insurance companies.  Define  ) , ( p F
I p  as the maximum profits earned by 
the  representative  insurer  when  faced  with  the  fixed  fee  F   and  supply  price  p .    The 
innovator’s problem can be expressed as: 
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This has the first order conditions: 
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  (27) 20 
Applying  the  envelope  theorem  to  the  insurer’s  profit  function  yields  the  results  that 
q
I
p - = p  and  1 - =
I
F p .  This then implies that  MC p = . 
C.2.3  Second-Best Efficiency of the Innovation Decision 
Innovators demand that insurers extract every bit of consumer surplus.  When insurers earn 
zero profits, all this surplus returns to the innovator.  Since this allows the innovator to 
extract all the surplus associated with her invention, the result is efficient innovation.   
The innovator invests in research to maximize ex ante profits, according to: 
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Competitive innovation is characterized by: 
  [ ] ( ) [ ] 1 ) ( ' ) ( ) ( ' = - + = - + MC m q I r MC p q F r r r   (29) 
Since the consumer’s receives only her reservation utility level, the insurer extracts all her 









.  Therefore, competitive ex post profits satisfy: 
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p   (30) 
The private return to innovation shown above matches the social return, given in the first 
order condition for r , in equations 19.  Once again, the innovator need not explicitly employ 
two-part pricing if she can set prices and quantity in negotiations with insurers. 
The (monetized) social return to a successful innovation is equal to: 
  ( )
Wealth of Utility Marginal
Innovation Without Utility Innovation With Utility ) ( -
  (31) 21 
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We can simplify this expression by taking first-order approximations of the differences in 
utility, and by noting that 
l
) (q v




















return Social   (33) 
This is the same as the private return to innovation and guarantees that the competitive level 
of research is second-best. 
C.3  The Competitive Equilibrium Without Ex Ante Pricing 
In  addition  to  its  usual  static  inefficiencies,  incompleteness  in  the  insurance  market  has 
adverse effects on dynamic efficiency in innovation.  If some people are uninsured, or if 
insurers have market power, monopolists may not be able to write and enforce efficient 
pricing contracts with insurers.  It is infeasible for innovators to write contracts with every 
potential consumer ex ante.  Therefore, if some consumers do not participate in an insurance 
pool, they are not open to such two-stage contracts.  More generally, innovators may worry 
                                                   
12  We  have  simplified  this  expression  with  the  help  of  three  results:    (1)  The  consumer 
indifference condition; (2) Zero profits in the insurance industry; and (3) Equal marginal utility 
across  the  “discovery”  and  “non-discovery”  states.    In  a  world  with  many  simultaneous 
innovation projects underway, there is minimal social risk posed by the success or failure of any 
single innovation project.  Therefore, we can safely regard marginal utility as invariant to the 
success or failure of any one innovation; this is the implication of condition (3). 22 
about the threat of price regulation if they attempt to extract the full value of consumer 
surplus from insurers.  For these and related reasons, two-stage contracting may be infeasible. 
The alternative is for the monopolist to sell directly to consumers at a fixed price, while 
consumers can purchase insurance payable in the event of purchase.
13  The result is the 
under-provision of innovation and a decline in social surplus.  Utilization may be greater or 
less than second-best utilization, depending on the relative size of the monopolist’s incentive 
to restrict quantity versus consumers’ willingness to subsidize ex post consumption of the 
innovation through an insurance premium. 
Consider  an  environment  where  an  insurer  can  reimburse  a  consumer  if  he  purchases  a 
product, but not otherwise.  However, the product is sold directly by the innovator to the 
consumer, at the single price  p .  Insurers sell contracts that reduce the ex post price in 
exchange for an actuarially fair ex ante payment; reducing the ex post price by  t  costs 
q I t =  ex ante.  The consumer chooses a level of insurance and ex post consumption 
maximize utility.  She chooses from an array of actuarially fair insurance contracts, and she 
can choose only time-consistent insurance contracts, where she has no incentive to deviate ex 
post.  The latter requirement implies that ex ante consumption decisions must maximize 
utility ex post. 
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13 Gaynor, Haas-Wilson and Vogt (2000) consider this case and show that despite moral hazard 
induced by competitive health insurance markets, a reduction in the price of medical care is 
always welfare enhancing. However they do not consider the role of higher prices in encouraging 
innovation.    23 
The consumer’s optimality conditions are given by: 
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In this environment, the consumer’s decisionmaking is efficient, even though the innovator’s 
might not be.  Formally, the consumer’s first-order conditions match the conditions for social 
efficiency, provided that they face efficient pricing (i.e., at marginal cost):  the condition for 
q  matches the second-best efficiency condition for  q ; the condition for  t  matches the 
second-best  condition  for  D c ;  the  condition  for  I   matches  the  sum  of  the  second-best 
conditions for  D c  and  N c . 
Departures from the second-best originate in the innovator’s problem, when she is unable to 
extract consumer surplus through a two-stage pricing strategy.  The monopolist maximizes 
profits,  taking  as  given  the  consumer’s  optimal  insurance  and  utilization  decisions.  
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This has the first order condition: 
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  (37) 
The innovator has the standard incentives of a monopolist.  Price exceeds marginal cost, 
because of the incentive to raise price by restricting quantity.  However, unlike the standard 24 
monopoly problem, utilization may be above or below the first- or second-best level, because 
consumers face the price  p p
q v
< - = t
g
) (
.  The relationship between utilization and its 
efficient level depends on the shape of the willingness to pay function and the consumer’s 
desire  for  insurance.    It  is  not  possible  to  determine  this  in  general  without  specific 
assumptions on functional form (Garber, Jones, and Romer, 2005). 
However, it is clear that consumer welfare in every state of the world is lower than in the 
second-best, because the monopolist charges a unit price that is higher than marginal cost.
14  
It is also clear that the monopolist’s profits are lower than when she has access to two-stage 
pricing.    The  absence  of  two-stage  contracting  thus  leads  to  inefficiently  low  levels  of 
innovation,  consumer  welfare,  and  social  surplus,  even  though  it  can  sometimes  raise 
utilization. 
Moreover,  it  is  also  clear  that  adding  an  insurance  market  improves  consumer  welfare, 
increases the profits of the innovator, and raises the level of innovation, compared to the 














  (38)  
                                                   
14 The first-order effect of this is to lower utility in every state of the world:  even non-consuming 
states face higher insurance premia. 
15 As discussed in footnotes 5 and 6, we abstract here from the presence of health indemnity 
insurance in the no-discovery, full information state. 25 
D.  Incremental Innovation 
Above, we considered the case of a brand-new innovation.  In practice, new innovations must 
compete with existing innovations for customers, and monopolistic competition is the norm.  
Competition  among  innovators  creates  market  failures  that  we  now  explore.    Our  basic 
results are unchanged if the incumbent’s profits remain the same after the entry of the new 
firm.    However,  in  cases  where  the  new  entrant  is  able  to  cannibalize  some  of  the 
incumbent’s  profits,  the  result  is  too  much  innovation,  because  the  entrant  spends  on 
innovation  simply  to  initiate  a  transfer  of  resources,  rather  than  a  creation  of  wealth.  
Efficiency can be maintained if the entrant is made to pay an ex post tax on profits that is 
equal to the decline in profits of the incumbent.  The key point for our purposes is that 
efficient health insurance markets still improve incentives for utilization and innovation. 
D.1  The Pareto Optimum 
An incremental innovation can be thought of in the context of the spatial model of consumers 
developed earlier.  The case where a new innovation supplants an older innovation entirely is 
very straightforward and behaves exactly as the earlier single-innovator case.  Consider the 
more complex case with a new innovation that is an improvement for some consumers, but 
not for other consumers.
16  The new innovation thus splits up the market with the original 
innovation.  Recall that the utility value of the original innovation was  ) (i v .  Define  ) (i vN  as 
the value of the new innovation, where there exists  N i  such that  ) ( ) ( i v i vN >  for  N i i <  
and  ) ( ) ( i v i vN £  for  N i i ³ .  To ensure that this point is unique, we also assume that 
                                                   
16 We confine our attention to sequential innovation investments, rather than simultaneous “races” 
between several innovators. 26 
0
' ' < < O N v v .  Without loss of generality, suppose that  q iN < , so that some consumers 
will use the original innovation even after the new one enters the market.
17 
Sick consumers now have three choices:  purchase the original innovation O, purchase the 
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  (39) 
Suppose that the marginal cost of producing the new innovation is the same as the old, so that 
the value of the new innovation lies purely on the demand side.  Define  N r  as research into 
the new innovation,  N q  as the quantity of the new innovation sold, and  O q  as the quantity of 
the old innovation sold if the new one is discovered.  Finally, define  ) (r U  as the level of 
expected utility enjoyed if research fails to yield a new innovation, but the old innovation is 
available.  This is the level of utility yielded by the earlier, single-innovation equilibrium; it 
involves two-part pricing by the innovator and partial insurance for consumers.  Maximum 
social surplus is obtained as the solution to:
18 
                                                   
17  Failure  of  this  assumption  necessitates  analysis  of  another  case  whose  results  are  largely 
similar. 
18 Note that there is also a third, non-binding, incentive compatibility constraint that guarantees 
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Equilibrium is characterized by the following first order conditions: 
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  (41) 
The key difference between this case and the earlier case lies in the level of optimal research 
spending.  When other inventions are present, the efficient return to research is equal to the 
increment in social surplus induced by the new innovation.  As a result, optimal research 
spending is lower when other inventions are present, because the incremental gain in social 
surplus from the innovation is less. 
At the second-best allocation:  (1) More insurance is provided for the newer innovation, 
because it confers more value on its users than the original innovation; (2) Partial insurance is 
provided to users of both innovations; (3) Both inventions are over-utilized relative to the 
first-best; and (4) Innovation is less than first-best. 28 
More insurance is provided for the newer innovation.  This is not a generic result, but follows 
here because the new innovation provides more value to its users than the old innovation.  
The general result is that more insurance will be provided for the higher value innovation. 




D c c £ .  Since the marginal utility of ex 
post wealth must necessarily be less than the marginal utility in the most impoverished state, 
it must be true that  ) ( ' L c u
N
D - < l .
19  The first order condition for 
N
D c  then implies that 
0 < N m .    Adding  up  the  first  order  conditions  for  N q   and  O q   yields 
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D c c > , but this contradicts our original assumption and proves the claim. 
In this particular case, the equilibrium users of the new innovation have a higher average 
willingness to pay for the innovation than the users of the old innovation.  Therefore, they are 
more willing to transfer resources to the states in which the new innovation is used than those 
in which the old innovation is used. 
Partial insurance is provided for both innovations. The incompleteness of information again 
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19 Using the conditions for  N c , 
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D - ³ - .    Moreover,  the  incentive  compatibility 
constraints  require  that 
N
D N c c > .    Therefore,  the  denominator  is  strictly  greater  than 
) ( ' L c u N - , but the numerator is strictly smaller than this quantity.  This implies the result. 29 
Moreover,  since  ) ( ' L c u
O
D - < l ,  the  condition  for 
O
D c   implies  that  O N m m > ,  which 
ensures  that  0 < O m   as  well.    Since  0 < O m ,  the  condition  for  O q   implies  that 
O
D N c c MC - > , which implies partial insurance for the old innovation.  Since  0 , < N O m m , 
the condition for  N q  implies that 
N
D N c c MC - > , which implies partial insurance for the 
new innovation as well. 
This  finding  implies  the  last  two  results.    Since  partial  insurance  is  provided  for  both 
innovations, both inventions are over-utilized in the sense that some individuals use them 
whose benefit is less than marginal cost.  Finally, since incomplete information lowers the 
total ex post consumer surplus, innovation will be less than the first-best in this context. 
D.2  The Competitive Equilibrium 
With more than one firm present, the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium depends on 
how the incumbent innovator responds to the new innovator’s entry.  The two-stage pricing 
contract  yields  the  second-best  allocation  of  resources  if  the  incumbent’s  profits  are 
unaffected.  If, however, the new innovator captures some of the incumbent’s profits, the 
result is excessive innovation, as the new innovator seeks to capture some of the incumbent’s 
rents.  Efficiency can be restored if the new innovator is charged a lump-sum tax on ex post 
profits, equal to the change in the incumbent’s profits. 
Insurers now sell two insurance contracts.  The first transfers resources to the insured when 
she buys innovation O, and the second transfers resources if innovation N is purchased.  
Since the contracts can be offered separately, insurers must make zero profits on each of 
them.    In  turn,  insurers  contract  with  the  innovators  to  purchase  the  right  to  buy  the 
innovation.  Innovators employ a two-part pricing strategy, where they charge an ex ante fee 
coupled with an ex post unit price. 30 
D.2.1  Second-Best Efficiency of Utilization 
In  competitive  equilibrium,  the  consumer  chooses  the  states  of  the  world  in  which  she 
purchases  an  innovation,  and  which  innovation  she  purchases.    She  takes  as  given  the 
insurance contracts offered by the insurance industry.  The contract associated with the new 
innovation N is defined by the premium, copayment pair ( N I ,  N m ), while ( O I ,  O m ) defines 
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The consumer’s optimal utilization decision sets the marginal benefit of the innovation equal 
to the private marginal cost: 
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The first condition is identical to the second-best incentive compatibility condition for  O q .  
The second is identical to a linear combination of the two second-best incentive-compatibility 
conditions for  O q  and  N q . 
D.2.2  Second-Best Efficiency of State-Specific Consumption 
Insurers now sell two insurance contracts, one for each of the innovations available.  Taking 
as  given  the  offers  of  the  innovators,  the  representative  insurer  decides  how  to  price  its 
contracts by maximizing its profits, subject to a reservation utility level  R U  for consumers, ex 
post incentive-compatibility, and the consumer’s demand function.  The reservation utility 
level  R U  is the level of utility the consumer obtains from contracting only with the incumbent 31 
monopolist.
20  Since any insurer has the option of providing a single insurance contract, this 
constraint must be satisfied.  This yields the insurer’s problem: 
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  (44) 
In equilibrium, profits on each of the types of insurance contracts will be zero.   
Analytically, it helps to rewrite the problem as we did in Section C.2.2.  In and of itself, the 
profit-maximization problem is equivalent to maximizing the consumer’s utility subject to a 
nonnegativity constraint on profits.  In this case, there are two nonnegativity constraints, one 
for  each  contract  offered  by  the  insurer.    In  addition,  the  insurer  must  respect  ex  post 
incentive-compatibility  and  optimal  demand  choices  by  consumers.    Satisfying  the 
consumer’s demand conditions requires that the copayment rate equal the marginal person’s 
willingness  to  pay.    Finally,  the  solution  must  satisfy  the  equilibrium  condition  that  the 
consumer’s utility be equal to  R U . 
Defining  ) ( N N q T   and  ) ( O N O q q T +   as  the  willingness  to  pay  functions,  we  can  use  the 
arguments above to rewrite the representative insurer’s problem as: 
                                                   
20  Without  loss  of  generality,  we  assume  that  this  level  of  utility  is  higher  than  contracting 
exclusively with the new entrant, and higher than utility from no insurance at all. 32 
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In addition to the four constraints, and an equilibrium condition that guarantees consumer 
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The presence of the second innovator does not affect the functioning of the insurance market.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that these competitive first order conditions are simply linear 33 
combinations of the efficiency conditions.  In isolation, the insurance market continues to 
behave efficiently. 
Note first that the conditions for  N I  and  O I  imply that  O N l l = , so that the first two 
competitive first order conditions are identical.  It is also easily confirmed that the 
competitive conditions for the insurance premium are both equivalent to the sum of the 
efficiency conditions for 
N
D c , 
O
D c , and  N c .  Moreover, provided that the competitive price  p 
equals marginal cost, the other two competitive conditions are equivalent to their efficiency 
counterparts.  Examining the condition for  N q , the two terms in square brackets are zero 
according to the efficiency conditions for 
N
D c  and 
O
D c , respectively.  The remaining terms 
match the efficiency condition for  N q , provided that price equals marginal cost.  Similarly, in 
the condition for  O q , the term in square brackets is zero according to the condition for 
O
D c , 
and the remaining terms match the efficiency condition for  O q , provided price equals 
marginal cost. 
It remains to verify that both innovators will choose unit prices that are equal to marginal 
cost.  Each innovator’s ex post decision involves maximizing her profits subject to the 
participation of insurance companies.  Define  ) , ( p F
I p  as the maximum profits earned (on a 
particular contract) by the representative insurer when faced with the fixed fee F  and supply 
price  p .  Each innovator’s problem can be expressed as: 
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This has the first order conditions: 
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  (48) 34 
Applying  the  envelope  theorem  to  the  insurer’s  profit  function  yields  the  results  that 
q
I
p - = p  and  1 - =
I
F p .  This then implies that  MC p = . 
D.2.3  Second-Best Efficiency of the Innovation Decision 
Incremental innovation does not affect the efficiency of consumers’ or insurers’ decisions, 
but it has a direct impact on the efficiency of innovation investments.  The new innovator 
invests in research to maximize ex ante profits, according to: 
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Competitive innovation is characterized by: 
  ( ) [ ] 1 ) ( ' ) ( ' = - + = N N N N MC m q I r F r r r   (50) 
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Using  the  consumer’s  incentive-compatibility  constraints  and  the  insurer’s  zero-profit 
conditions, we can simplify this as: 
                                                   
21  We  once  again  employ  the  assumption that  the  marginal  utility  of  wealth  l   is  the  same 
regardless of whether this particular innovation is discovered. 35 
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Using  what  we  learned  about  U   (which  is  equal  to  maximum  utility  with  the  original 
innovation alone) in the earlier analysis, this can be further simplified: 
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  (53) 
Using a first-order approximation to utility, and relying on the fact that  l is the marginal 
utility of wealth ex post, we can write this as: 
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  (54) 
Under the assumption that  v vO º , or that the new innovation does not change the value of 
the  old  innovation,  the marginal  user  of  the  old  innovation  will  be  the same  person,  or 
q q q N O = + .
22  This allows the further simplification: 
                                                   
22 Departures from the second-best will occur if there are complementarities between the two 
innovations.  In this case, the new innovator may not be able to capture the enhancement in value 36 
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Using the consumer’s incentive compatibility constraint for  N q  to derive the approximation 
) ( ) ( ) ( N O N N N O m m q v q v - » - l  allows us to write: 
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  (56) 
To  a  first-order  approximation,  the  social  return  to  the  innovation  is  equal  to  the  direct 
increment in consumer surplus enjoyed by the consumers of the new innovation. 
We now consider the conditions under which this equals the new innovator’s competitive 
return.  In competitive equilibrium, the innovator earns ex post profits: 
  ) ( MC m q I N N N - +   (57) 
The  consumer’s  reservation  utility  condition  implies  that  0 ) , , , ( = - R O N O N U m m I I EU .  
Taking first-order expansions around the points  0 = = + I I I O N  yields: 
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Defining  O p D  as the change in the profits of the original innovator, we can write: 
  ) ( MC m q I I O N O O - + D = - p   (59) 
Therefore, the profits of the new innovator can be written as: 
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The new innovator has efficient incentives, as long as the profits of the incumbent remain 
unchanged.  If, however, his profits fall, the new innovator has incentives to over-innovate.  
                                                                                                                                                       
of the old innovation from the other monopolist, unless of course there is a single monopolist 
inventing both products. 37 
In this case, the entrant is inheriting some of the incumbent’s profits.  Since this is just a 
transfer  rather  than  a  real  creation  of  resources,  it  gives  rise  to  inefficient  rent-seeking 
behavior.  The result is too much innovation.  An appropriate policy response is to tax the ex 
post  profits  of  the  entrant  by  exactly  the  amount  of  profit  lost  by  the  incumbent.    This 
corrects the tendency of the new innovator to over-invest in innovation. 
There is a corresponding danger that a firm entering a brand-new market will under-invest 
because a potential entrant might “steal” some of its profits.  To address this problem as well, 
the tax on the new innovator can be refunded to the incumbent.  Transfers among innovators 
can solve the efficiency problems that arise with multiple firms producing similar inventions.  
It is important to note that the insurance market can be left alone, as the innovation market is 
the source of the inefficiency. 
E.  Implications for Innovation and Insurance Policy 
Departures from the first- or second-best outcomes occur if:  (1) A new innovator is able to 
“poach” some of the profits of the incumbent; (2) The market for health insurance fails to be 
competitive;  or  (3)  The  market  for  health  insurance  is  incomplete.    The  analysis  above 
suggests the policy remedies most appropriate to these various failures.  In general, policy 
ought to focus on intervening in the innovation market to ensure that the private return to 
innovation does not exceed the social return, and on completing the insurance market or 
making it competitive. 
E.1  Innovation Market Intervention 
Intervention in the market for innovation can be called for when the entry of a new innovator 
reduces the profits of an incumbent.  In this case, the new innovator can extract both the 
additional consumer surplus he creates, plus some of the surplus that previously accrued to 38 
the original inventor.  The latter portion of the private return is socially excessive, since it 
involves nothing more than a transfer, rather than a real creation of social wealth.  As such,  
Pigovian taxes on ex post profits, equal to the incumbent’s decline in profits, can restore first- 
or second-best efficiency.  Note that the Pigovian tax is superior to price regulation, because 
it does not distort outcomes in the goods market. 
E.2  Insurance Market Intervention 
Market  power  or  other  incompleteness  in  the  insurance  market  can  compromise  the 
efficiency of innovation investments.  In the presence of market power, insurers will share 
some of the rents from innovation and thus depress the returns to research.  Moreover, market 
power or other imperfections can lead to less than full insurance.  Uninsured consumers do 
not have access to the two-part pricing contract afforded by insurance.  The innovator will 
charge them the standard monopoly price for her invention.  This leads to under-utilization in 
that segment of the market, and under-innovation for the entire market. 
Correcting  either  of  these  static  failures  in  the  insurance  market  can  raise  the  level  of 
innovation  and  improve  the  efficiency  of  utilization.    Aggressively  promoting  anti-trust 
policy  against  insurers  when  they  cover  patented  innovations  seems  important,  as  does 
promoting access to health insurance. 
E.3  Methods For Redistribution 
The equilibria constructed above involve the first-best levels of innovation and health-care 
utilization.  However, since consumers receive no surplus, it is possible that consumers do 
not  prefer  these  equilibria  to  other,  less  efficient  outcomes.    Theoretically,  it  is  always 
possible to solve distributional problems through appropriate transfers.  Any such transfer 39 
would have to be made from innovators to consumers, but the method of funding such a 
transfer cannot affect the margins of either the innovator or the consumer.   
A feasible way to achieve redistribution along the Pareto frontier is to tax the innovators 
expected profits.  Efficient incentives are achieved when the innovator faces expected profits 
r CS r d - ) ( .    If,  instead,  the  innovator  receives  ] ) ( )[ 1 ( r CS r d - - t ,  the  allocation  of 
resources is unchanged.  This requires a t -percent tax on eventual profits, coupled with a t -
percent subsidy for research and development expenditure.  The proceeds of the tax could 
then be disbursed to consumers.  This could achieve any desired distribution of resources 
across innovators and consumers, without affecting research effort or the utilization of the 
new innovation. 
E.4  Public Health Insurance 
Our  analysis  suggests  that  the  optimal  design  for  public  health insurance involves  a  co-
payment at marginal cost minus the degree of insurance, coupled with a premium payment 
that equals consumer surplus plus the actuarial cost of insurance.  The key implementation 
problem is determining these quantities accurately. 
A workable alternative is to mimic observed private insurance contracts.  While this may not 
guarantee first- or even second-best efficiency, increasing the availability of insurance at 
competitive prices improves ex ante and ex post welfare.  Ex post welfare increases as long 
as people receive some insurance and utilization rises; this will always be satisfied.  Ex ante 
welfare will increase as long as costs paid to innovators do not exceed consumer surplus.  
Following observed competitively determined contracts ensures that this condition will be 
satisfied:  in a competitive market, consumers would opt out of insurance contracts that paid 
innovators an amount greater than consumer surplus, since the associated premium would 
also exceed the value of the insurance to the consumer. 40 
The Medicare Drug Benefit is an example of a public health insurance scheme that must at 
least be welfare-improving according to this logic.  Medicare solicits competitive bids from 
insurers for drug insurance.  This may not yield the first- or even second-best outcome, 
because competitively determined prices will reflect market power or other imperfections in 
the insurance market.  Nonetheless, it is certain that the payment made to innovators will 
increase their profits, but will not lead to excessive returns on their investments.  Moreover, 
the increase in insurance and utilization will also increase static efficiency from the point of 
view of today’s patients. 
F.  Conclusions 
Uncertainty in the demand for health care innovation provides leverage with which to solve 
the  nagging  problem  of  encouraging  efficient  innovation  ex  ante  while  still  permitting 
efficient utilization ex post.  An insurance contract can function as a two-part pricing scheme 
that yields efficient outcomes, where an innovator sells his product at marginal cost, but 
receives an ex ante payment equal to the full value of expected consumer surplus.  This 
analysis reveals how static failures in insurance markets can lead to dynamic inefficiencies in 
the  market  for  innovation,  and  it  also  points  to  the  importance  of  maintaining  efficient 
insurance markets.  Indeed, patent monopolies in and of themselves are not socially harmful 
if they coexist with an efficient market for health insurance. 
The optimal design of a public health insurance scheme ought to couple co-payments at or 
below  marginal  cost  (depending  on  the  level  of  insurance  desired),  along  with  premium 
payments equal to actuarial cost plus the consumer surplus associated with the goods being 
purchased.  Since these quantities are difficult to observe, a practical, welfare-improving 
alternative  is  for  a  public  insurance  system  to  follow  the  reimbursements  and  premium 
schedules determined by competitive insurers. 41 
The link between innovation and insurance is crucial to the ex ante and ex post efficiency of 
health care markets.  Many have argued that the presence of moral hazard in health insurance 
contracts can help offset the incentives for quantity-restriction faced by monopolists.  In fact, 
the  relationship  between  insurance  and  innovation  is  much  more  fundamental  and  less 
coincidental.    Competitive  insurance  markets  can  structurally  remove  inefficiencies 
associated  with  patent  monopolies,  regardless  of  the  extent  of  moral  hazard  present  in 
preferences and information. 42 
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